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Abstract
In the wake of violent conflict, a key element of building a durable peace is building a
state with the ability to collect and manage public resources. To implement peace accords
and provide public services, the government must be able to collect revenue, allocate
resources, and manage expenditure in a manner that is regarded by its citizens as
effective and equitable. This paper addresses eight key issues related to this challenge.
The first four pertain to resource mobilization: (i) How should distributional impacts
enter into revenue policies? (ii) How can postwar external assistance do more to prime
the pump of domestic revenue capacity? (iii) Should macroeconomic strictures prescribed
for economic stabilization be relaxed to foster political stabilization? (iv) How should the
benefits of external resources be weighed against their costs? The second four issues
relate to the expenditure side of public finance: (i) How should the dynamics of conflict
be factored into public spending policies? (ii) Can the pathologies of a ‘dual public
sector’ – one funded and managed by the government, the other by the aid donors – be
surmounted by channeling external resources through the government, with dual-control
oversight mechanisms to reduce corruption? (iii) How should long-term fiscal
sustainability enter into short-term expenditure decisions? (iv) Lastly, is there scope for
more innovative solutions to postwar legacies of external debts?
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Introduction

In the wake of violent conflict, a key element of building a durable peace is building a
state with the ability to collect and manage public resources. To implement peace accords
and to provide public services, the government must be able to collect revenue, allocate
resources, and manage expenditure in a manner that is regarded by its citizens as
effective and equitable.

The Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, adopted by the
development ministers of major donor countries in March 2005, declares that
statebuilding is ‘the central objective.’ This represents a striking break from the
prevailing wisdom in the closing decades of the 20th century, when the state was widely
regarded as the problem. The state has been rediscovered: it is now invoked as the
solution. The policy rhetoric has changed from downsizing states to building state
capacity.

Building state capacities in public finance is crucial to the success of peacebuilding
efforts for three reasons:

•

First, governments must be able to ensure sustainable funding for new democratic
institutions, for social programs that ease tensions and redress grievances, and for
public investments to promote economic growth and development. In the early
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postwar years, countries often receive a large influx of external assistance that
temporarily can meet some of these needs. But aid typically diminishes over time,
so domestic resources are necessary to sustain these institutions and programs. A
key challenge is to ensure that aid does not ‘crowd out’ domestic fiscal capacities,
but instead stimulates their growth.

•

Second, fiscal capacities are needed to build a legitimate state. Democratic
elections do not, in and of themselves, ensure state legitimacy. Neither do ‘quick
impact projects’ in which international aid agencies seek to fill urgent needs.
Legitimacy comes in large part from government delivery of services that people
need and want. Elections provide an avenue for the citizenry to voice demands;
responding to those demands requires the capacity to mobilize, allocate, and
spend public resources effectively.

•

Third, in some cases there is a need to curtail extra-legal taxation by ‘warlords’
and armed groups so as to enhance security. In Afghanistan, for example, control
of border customs outposts is not only a fiscal issue but also a security issue.
Similarly, control over revenues from natural-resource extraction, such as logging
in Cambodia or diamonds in West Africa, is often crucial for establishing the
state’s monopoly not only in legitimate taxation but also in legitimate force. At
the same time, domestic fiscal capacity is the only sustainable source of financing
for public security after external peacekeepers have withdrawn.
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There is a profound interdependence between the state’s ability to allocate and manage
expenditures and its ability to mobilize domestic resources. On the one hand, the volume
of domestic revenue limits the volume of expenditure, a constraint that can be eased but
not eliminated by international aid and deficit finance. On the other hand, the willingness
of the citizenry to pay taxes hinges on its perception that the state will effectively deliver
public goods and services – including infrastructure, public safety, health and education –
in return. If the state fails to uphold its end of this social compact, its ability to raise
revenue encounters serious political and administrative constraints.

The international community can help to resolve this chicken-and-egg dilemma by
providing external resources. In principle, these can fund expenditures that enhance both
the ability to pay taxes by stimulating economic recovery and the willingness to pay taxes
by demonstrating the state’s capacity to deliver results. In practice, however, this positive
outcome is not automatic. Budget allocation and expenditure management capacities do
not spring forth spontaneously in response to resource availability; they must be built
painstakingly over time. The legitimacy of the state rests not only on its ability to provide
public goods and services, but also on its willingness to respond to the expressed needs
and demands of the public. If external resources fail to build core public finance
capacities, and if the state’s attentiveness to the preferences of donors deflects it from
responding to the needs and demands of its own people, then the long-run contribution of
aid to this crucial dimension of statebuilding will prove marginal at best.
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In this paper I address eight issues related to the challenges faced by postwar states in
strengthening their capacities for more effective public finance, suggesting ways to better
fit donor aid to this critical dimension of peacebuilding as statebuilding.

The first four issues pertain to resource mobilization: How should distributional impacts
enter into revenue policies? How can postwar external assistance do more to prime the
pump of domestic revenue capacity? Should macroeconomic strictures prescribed for
economic stabilization be relaxed to foster political stabilization? How should the
benefits of external resources be weighed against their costs?

The second four issues relate to the expenditure side of public finance: How should the
dynamics of conflict be factored into public spending policies? Can the pathologies of a
‘dual public sector’ – one funded and managed by the government, the other by the aid
donors – be surmounted by channeling external resources through the government, with
dual-control oversight mechanisms to reduce corruption? How should long-term fiscal
sustainability enter into short-term expenditure decisions? Lastly, is there scope for more
innovative solutions to postwar legacies of external debts?

My discussion of these issues draws on the Project on Public Finance in Postconflict
Statebuilding, a collaborative research effort hosted by New York University’s Center on
International Cooperation.1
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1. Who Pays? Revenue through a conflict lens

The size of government revenue relative to gross domestic product in wartorn societies
typically is far below the average for other countries with similar per capita income.2 At
the same time, the needs for government expenditure are, if anything, greater. Hence
concerted efforts are needed to increase revenues.

But size is not all that matters. In addition to the total volume of revenue, the
distributional impact of revenue collection matters, too. Economists usually think about
distribution in terms of ‘vertical equity,’ differences between rich and poor. But
‘horizontal equity’ – differences across population groups defined in terms of ethnicity,
race, religion, or region – often figures as much (or more) in the dynamics of conflict.

For this reason, in the past decade scholars and policy makers have begun to pay more
attention to inter-group disparities. Researchers have analyzed the role of horizontal
equity in the genesis of civil wars (Stewart 2000, 2002; Østby 2004). Economists have
begun to think hard about how to measure it, starting with spatial inequalities across
regions (Stewart et al. 2007; Kanbur and Venables 2005). International aid agencies
increasingly recognize the need for ‘conflict impact assessment’ as an input into policy
making and project appraisal, and some have begun to put this recognition into practice.3

Yet to date, little has been done to bring these insights to bear on revenue policies. The
primary revenue goal of postwar government authorities, and of the international
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agencies that seek to assist them, has been to increase the volume of collections; the
secondary goal has been to do so as ‘efficiently’ as possible. To be sure, increasing the
volume of revenue is no small task. And efficiency – if understood in terms of the
realities of wartorn societies, as opposed to textbook axioms – is desirable. But neglect of
the distributional impacts of taxation can subvert both of these goals.

The starting point for any effort to address this lacuna must be careful documentation of
the distributional incidence of revenue instruments, both vertical and horizontal.
Collecting the necessary data will be a non-trivial task, for today there is a paucity of
such information even in ‘normal’ developing countries, let alone in wartorn societies.4
This can be contrasted with the situation in the industrialized countries, where the
distributional impacts of proposed taxes typically are subjected to intense scrutiny by
politicians and policy makers alike. Ironically, it is precisely where the need for such
analysis is greatest – in societies that have embarked on the fragile transition from war to
peace – that these issues receive the least attention. Technical assistance from the
international community could play a valuable role in filling this information gap.

Documentation is only the first step. The second is to incorporate this information into
policy making. In choosing the mix of revenue instruments – the balance between tariffs,
value-added taxes and income taxes, for example – their distributional incidence must be
considered alongside their revenue potential, administrative feasibility, and efficiency
effects. One option that would be likely to receive much more attention, once revenue is
seen through the distributional lens, is luxury taxation. Taxes on items such as private
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automobiles and private aircraft can combine the attractions of administrative ease,
distributional progressivity, and substantial revenue. Yet, remarkably, they rarely feature
in discussions of postwar revenue policies.

Finally, information on the distributional impacts of revenue instruments, and on the
ways that government policies are taking these into account, must be disseminated widely
to the public, so as to guard against misperceptions and facilitate compliance by
legitimizing the policies. The importance of this was demonstrated vividly in Guatemala,
where the peace accords set explicit targets for increasing government revenue and social
expenditure. To this end, the first postwar government attempted to increase the tax on
large property owners. This effort was scuttled, however, in the face of protests not only
from estate owners but also from small-scale indigenous farmers who thought that the tax
would burden them (Rodas 2007, p. 90; Jonas 2000, pp. 171-172). The lesson is clear:
successful revenue policymaking cannot be a purely technocratic preserve; it must be part
and parcel of the democratic process.

2. Priming the Pump? External support for domestic revenue mobilization

Experience has shown that aid can ‘crowd out’ domestic revenue mobilization, reducing
the incentive for the government to tax its own populace. If aid instead is to ‘crowd in’
domestic revenue, conscious efforts are needed to this end. The international community
can support government efforts to mobilize domestic revenue in four ways: by providing
technical assistance; by linking some of its aid to progress in domestic revenue
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performance; by helping to curb extra-legal revenue exactions; and by reducing tax
exemptions on postwar aid.

(i) Technical assistance (TA) is the most common type of support. In public finance, as
in other arenas, the effectiveness of TA could be strengthened by efforts to adopt
technologies and procedures that build on existing capacities, rather than opting for offthe-shelf imported solutions. In Afghanistan, for example, Ghani et al. (2007, p. 167)
report that computerized information systems introduced at the Ministry of Finance were
‘unsuitable in terms of complexity and language,’ prompting subsequent efforts to retool
with Persian-language systems from Iran.

There is also scope for greater conflict sensitivity in technical assistance. In some cases,
TA providers have shown an impressive ability to cast aside orthodoxies and adapt their
policy advice to local realities. For example, despite the aversion of the international
financial institutions (IFIs) to trade taxes, import duties were recognized as the most
feasible source of revenue enhancement in Timor-Leste, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. In the
case of Timor-Leste, the IMF even supported the introduction of a levy on coffee exports
(Pires and Francino 2007, p. 131), a policy that verges on the heretical. In other cases,
however, orthodoxy has triumphed over pragmatism. In Guatemala, for example, even as
the IMF gave rhetorical support to the goal of revenue enhancement mandated by the
peace accords, the Fund’s staff urged the government to cut tariffs.5 Theoretical work and
empirical evidence cast doubt on both the efficiency advantages of a shift from tariffs to
value-added taxes and the prospects for accomplishing this without a decline in total
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revenues.6 Nevertheless, this remains a key plank of IFI policy prescriptions in
developing countries. In postwar countries, where administrative capacities are especially
weak and the need for revenue especially pressing, the case for departures from
orthodoxy is all the more compelling.

(ii) Conditionality is a second way that donors can encourage domestic resource
mobilization. On the expenditure side of fiscal policy, it is not unusual for donors to
require ‘counterpart funding’ by the government as a condition for aid to specific
projects, a strategy intended to ensure domestic ‘buy-in’ and to counteract fungibility
(whereby aid merely frees government money for other uses). But on the revenue side,
conditionality of this type has been rare. It would be a straightforward matter to link
certain types of aid – notably budget support – to progress in meeting domestic revenue
targets. Such a policy is akin to the provision of ‘matching grants’ by private foundations.
In both cases, the aim is to strengthen incentives for aid recipients to seek further
resources, counteracting the disincentive effects of unconditional aid.7

Visiting Guatemala in May 1997, a few months after the signing of that country’s peace
accords, IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus took a broad step in this direction
when he stated that the Fund’s only condition for a stand-by agreement would be that the
government comply with its peace-accord commitments, including a 50% increase in the
revenue-to-GDP ratio.8 Making a tighter linkage, the European Union made its budget
support to the government of Mozambique in 2002 conditional on increases in domestic
revenue.9 One of the benchmarks in the Afghanistan Compact signed in London in early
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2006, which sets out the framework for international assistance to that country over the
next five years, is to increase the revenue/GDP ratio from 4.5% in 2004/05 to 8% in
2010/11.10 But conditionality with respect to revenue mobilization remains the exception,
not the rule.

One way to implement revenue conditionality would be for donors to enter into a multiyear compact to provide matching funds for direct budget support. Donors could agree to
match a percentage of the funds collected by the host government up to a fixed limit. The
percentage could be reduced over time, reflecting the increasing capacity of the host
government to raise revenue, and the expected increase in economic activity and
therefore the tax base. The simplest system would involve monthly certification of the
changes in the balance of the Ministry of Finance general revenue account at the Central
Bank by an independent authority, and based on these changes, automatic disbursements
from the trust fund into the revenue account (Carnahan 2007).

(iii) Curbing extra-legal revenue exactions in some cases is a critical postwar task, one
that is located on the cusp between public finance and security. When profits from the
exploitation of nominally public resources, like Cambodia’s forests, flow into private
pockets, this not only deprives the state of revenues but also often finances quasiautonomous armed groups that threaten the peace (Le Billon 2000). When local warlords
levy ‘taxes’ on trade, sometimes including trade in narcotics, as in Afghanistan, they
undermine the state’s monopoly not only in revenue collection but also in the legitimate
exercise of force. Curtailing such activities may require the assistance of international
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peacekeeping forces, which is what prompted the Afghan finance ministry’s request for
help in securing customs posts (Ghani et al. 2007, p. 170). Yet peacekeeping forces, even
those with a relatively expansive mandate like the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) in Afghanistan, typically have not seen this as a part of their job.

Even more problematic, powerful members of the international community may be
reluctant to crack down on extra-legal revenue exactions when they regard those involved
as political allies. In Afghanistan, for example, efforts to consolidate revenue in the hands
of the state and to fight drug trafficking have been complicated – to put it lightly – by the
decision of the United States government to enlist anti-Taliban warlords as partners in its
‘global war on terror.’ Such marriages of convenience, reminiscent of U.S. support to the
anti-Soviet mujahadeen in the 1980s, may serve short-run security objectives, but do so
only at the expense of undermining the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state – and
ultimately security too – in the long run.11

(iv) Reducing tax exemptions on postwar aid flows could do a great deal to prime the
pump of domestic revenue-collection capacity. In the early postwar years, aid is often the
single biggest component of the formal-sector economy. Yet today aid flows, and the
incomes generated by them, are largely exempt from taxation by the governments of aidreceiving countries. The incomes of expatriate aid officials and aid workers are taxexempt. The incomes of the local staff of aid agencies, frequently quite high by local
standards, are often tax-free too. The goods imported by the aid agencies, ranging from
Toyota land cruisers to cases of Coca-Cola and whiskey, often enter the country duty-
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free. The rents paid by expatriates for office space and housing – again, often exorbitant
by local standards – are frequently tax-free. So are other services provided to them, such
as hotels and restaurants.

These pervasive exemptions have several adverse consequences. Most obvious is the
opportunity cost of foregone government revenues. In addition, scarce administrative
capacity is devoted to administering different rules for different people. Goods that enter
the country as aid frequently wind up on sale in local markets, undercutting legitimate
competitors who pay import duties.12 Last but not least, the special treatment accorded to
expatriates sends an unmistakable message to the local populace: rich and powerful
people do not have to pay taxes. The result can be ‘the creation of a culture of tax
exemptions,’ in the words of a recent IMF review of post-conflict experiences (Gupta et
al. 2005, p. 12). This demonstration effect runs precisely counter to efforts to establish
effective and progressive revenue collection systems. It also undermines the credibility of
international agencies when they argue, as in Cambodia, that governments should reduce
tax loopholes and ‘tax incentives’ for local businesses (Smoke and Taliercio 2007, p. 82).

Efforts to tax aid bonanzas – even with backing from the IMF – have run into adamant
resistance from aid donors. In Timor-Leste, efforts to tax the floating hotels in the Dili
harbor that accommodated the postwar influx of foreigners were rebuffed by lawyers at
United Nations headquarters in New York, on the dubious grounds that diplomatic
‘privileges and immunities’ extend to those who provide services to UN personnel (Pires
and Francino 2007, p. 135). In Afghanistan, the introduction of a tax on rental incomes
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generated by expatriates in Kabul likewise met resistance (Carnahan 2007, p. 9). As
Ghani et al. (2007, p. 174) remark, ‘the international community’s declarations on the
importance of enhancing domestic revenue mobilization have not been matched by
willingness to consider new initiatives to tap the revenue possibilities generated by their
own presence.’

This issue has often pitted the IMF and World Bank, along with national officials, against
other donor agencies. In the case of Timor-Leste, Pires and Francino (2007, p. 136) recall
‘bitter fights between international officials at the Ministry of Finance and international
officials of donor organizations … with the latter winning.’ The finance ministry’s
inability to tax the international presence where there was not an explicit legal basis for
their exemption came as a ‘bitter blow’: ‘Generally the donors and the UN, who
disagreed about many things, were as one on their inviolable right to a complete
exemption from taxes, not only for themselves as individuals or for goods imported for
their direct use, but also on their contractors and goods imported for reconstruction.’

As Pries and Francino (2007, p. 136) explain, donor agency staff made three arguments
against paying taxes. The first was that this would be equivalent to budget support. This
is true. But its implicit premise – that the government cannot be trusted to use tax
revenues well – again sends a clear message to the local populace. The second argument
was that expatriates were already paying taxes in their countries of origin. In cases where
this is so, existing tax treaties allow credits for taxes paid elsewhere, avoiding the
problem of double taxation. The third argument was that no other countries where they
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worked had taxed them, ‘so why should East Timor be any different?’ The answer to this
objection is, of course, that desirable changes have to begin somewhere.

Under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, UN
officials are ‘exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by the
United Nations’ (United Nations 1946, sec. 18b).13 Most bilateral aid agreements today
include a clause that grants the donor agencies privileges and immunities that are ‘no less
than’ those enjoyed by the United Nations (Carnahan 2007, p. 7). Although the
Convention makes no mention of local staff or contractors, over time its tax exemptions
often have been construed to cover them, too.

There are good reasons to revisit and reinterpret the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities regarding the extent of exemptions for United Nations missions and, by
extension, bilateral missions, international agencies, and international and local
contractors from local taxes, fees, and user charges. As Carnahan (2007, p. 10) observes,
‘The Convention was crafted 60 years ago in a very different environment from that in
which the United Nations now operates. Today there are many more peacekeeping
missions … and peacekeeping missions have become more complex involving a broader
array of activities.’ A meeting to consider the taxation treatment of the international
community could be convened under the auspices of the OECD’s Development
Assistance Committee (DAC), the new UN Peacebuilding Commission, or the IMF.
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Initiatives could also be taken by individual donor countries acting unilaterally, in the
form of ‘payments in lieu of taxes’ (PILOTs). This solution has been adopted in a number
of college towns in the U.S., where municipal governments quite understandably want
tax-exempt institutions of higher education to contribute to funding public schools, police
and fire protection, and other local services. Negotiated PILOTs maintain the legal
privileges of those who make the payments, and open the door for those donors who are
serious about building domestic revenue capacity to act without waiting for across-theboard solutions.

If such agreements were to include income tax payments by expatriate or local aid
personnel, these need not come from the own pockets of the individuals covered. Those
who pay taxes could be given salary ‘top-ups’ to maintain their after-tax incomes, just as
US citizens employed by the United Nations system, including the World Bank and IMF,
now receive pay increments to compensate for the fact that they must pay US income
taxes.

3. Economic versus Political Stabilization? Balancing the budget deficit

An alternative way that governments can mobilize domestic resources – apart from
increasing revenues – is to borrow or print money to cover budget deficits. In many
postwar settings, a lack of well-developed financial markets means that domestic
borrowing is not feasible. Even where this is possible, governments may be reluctant to
borrow since this could push up interest rates and dampen private investment.
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Printing money can be a more tempting option. This does not require the institutional
capacities for a market in government bonds. Instead the government ‘borrows’ from its
own central bank. But this type of deficit finance has costs, too. If printing money fuels
rapid inflation, this can disrupt the economy, hit the real incomes of the poor (who
generally are least able to ‘index’ their incomes to prices), and spark political unrest.

For these reasons, many economists advocate tight restrictions on budget deficits in
general, and restrictions on Central Bank financing of them in particular. One need not be
a monetarist economist to appreciate the merits of this position. Yet controlling inflation
is not the sole objective of economic policy. In settings with widespread unemployment
(or underemployment) and slack demand, modest inflation may be a tolerable price to
pay for gains in employment and growth.14 The conventional economic wisdom today
holds that inflation cannot boost employment in the long run. In the short run, however,
there is no doubt that inflationary finance can provide an economic stimulus.

In postwar countries, short-run concerns have special salience. The macroeconomic goal
of price stability must be pursued alongside the peacebuilding goal of political stability.
The former requires efforts to balance the budget, or at least to rein in the gap between
expenditure and revenue. But the latter may require expenditures to implement peaceaccord commitments and to address pressing social needs that surpass the resources
available to the government. In such settings, the need for a balanced budget itself must
be balanced against the urgent need for peace-related spending.
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When confronted with the argument that relaxation of price-stability targets could
increase political stability by allowing more expenditures to ease social tensions,
proponents of ‘sound money’ counter that price instability fuels social tensions, too. Both
sides may be right. Beyond some point, high inflation – and certainly ‘hyperinflation’ at
rates above 50% per month – would harm the economy in general and the poor in
particular, exacerbating tensions. At the same time, however, excessively tight money
and a complete refusal to finance budget deficits via the ‘inflation tax’ could impede
efforts to fund peace-related needs.

If so, the relationship between the macroeconomic stability and political stability may
take the shape of an inverted ‘U’, rather than a straight line. This is depicted in Figure 1.
The horizontal axis represents price stability, with movement away from the origin
denoting lower inflation. The vertical axis represents political stability, with movement
away from the origin denoting lower social tensions. Supporters of stringent anti-inflation
policies assume that the country is on the upward-sloping part of the curve, segment AB,
where greater macroeconomic stability fosters greater political stability. In asserting that
there is a tradeoff between the two, critics of these policies assume that the country is on
the downward-sloping segment, BC.

Both scenarios are plausible. Research at the interface between macroeconomics and
conflict impact assessment is needed to estimate where the turning point is located in any
given time and place. Equally important is to explore policies that might shift the curve,
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easing potential tradeoffs between macroeconomic and political stability. If, for example,
there is scope for shifting public expenditure from items that do little to consolidate peace
to other uses that are central to this goal, this would help to reconcile the two stability
objectives.

Figure 1: Price stability and political stability

Political
stability
B

A

C

___________________________________________________
Price stability

Even though some relaxation of budget-deficit targets may be warranted to advance the
goal of political stabilization, the scope for financing public spending by this route is
limited: at some point, price instability will feed into political instability. Printing money
may increase the government’s room for maneuver at the margin, but it is not a ‘soft’
substitute for domestic revenue mobilization. As Coats (2007, p. 215) remarks, ‘the
possibility of central bank lending to the government historically has often proven an
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irresistible temptation.’ Opening the door a crack can let in flood of inflationary finance.
Moreover there are some cases in which very strict monetary policies – or even a
straightjacket on the central bank’s ability to print money, in the form of ‘dollarization’
or a currency board – can enhance political stability, by taking a bone of contention off
the table. Coats (2007) argues that was the case in Bosnia, where a currency board
arrangement was mandated in the Dayton peace agreement. There may be good
arguments for recalibrating monetary discipline in light of the political demands of warto-peace transitions, but there is no good argument for abandoning it.

4. How Much Aid? Dilemmas in external resource mobilization

Government expenditures can be funded by external resources as well as by domestic
resources – that is, by grants and loans from overseas. In postwar countries, these
external resources come mostly from official aid donors: the Bretton Woods institutions,
the regional development banks, and bilateral aid agencies.

For recipients, aid has both benefits and costs. External budget support allows a
government to spend money – for example, to pay teachers, healthcare workers, and
public security forces – beyond the constraints otherwise imposed by its capacity to
mobilize domestic resources. This buys time for the government to increase domestic
revenues. The costs to the recipient country include the risk that external resources will
crowd out domestic resource mobilization; the risk that external resources will lead to
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unsustainable expenditure commitments; and the risks posed by exchange-rate
appreciation and policies to counter it.

When a government’s popularity among aid donors enables it to attract substantial budget
support, the IMF sometimes presses for ceilings on the ‘domestic primary deficit,’ the
extent to which the government uses aid to finance public expenditure. These ceilings are
intended to contain the potential adverse macroeconomic effects of aid inflows. The logic
is that foreign currency inflows from aid can lead to exchange-rate appreciation, making
the country’s tradable-goods sector (exports and import substitutes) less competitive, a
phenomenon akin to the ‘Dutch disease’ in which a boom in natural-resource exports has
the same effect. If the Central Bank increases the money supply to counter upward
pressure on the exchange rate, this can lead to inflation. If the Central Bank issues bonds
to absorb the increased money supply and control inflation (a policy mix known as
‘sterilization’), this can push up domestic interest rates, adversely affecting private
investment. Faced with the tradeoffs among exchange-rate appreciation, inflation, and
higher interest rates, aid ceilings represent a policy for damage control.

To control the domestic primary deficit in Uganda, for example, the government imposes
limits on the share of expenditure in each ministry that can be financed by external
resources. As Ndikumana and Nannyonjo (2007, p. 47) these aid-intensity ceilings inflict
yet another kind of damage, constraining expenditures that could improve social welfare.
Uganda’s health targets go unmet even as unemployed doctors and nurses emigrate
abroad in search of work.15 When a country has unemployed resources that can be put to

22
work with aid financing – as appears to the case in this instance – the very elastic supply
response means that the impacts of greater aid absorption on inflation and the exchange
rate would likely be modest.16 Moreover, Ndikumana and Nannyonjo (2007, pp. 46-47)
argue that aid-intensity ceilings fail to take due account of the fact that much aid is spent
abroad on goods and services that do not compete with local production – for example,
on technical assistance salaries that are deposited directly into foreign bank accounts.
Since such aid does not pose sterilization dilemmas, there is no reason to include it in the
calculation of expenditure ceilings.

A recent IMF study echoes these concerns. Instead of real exchange-rate appreciation as
aid flows surged, Uganda actually experienced depreciation and low inflation, a scenario
that suggests ‘a rapid supply response to aid expenditures or high import propensities’ as
well as fiscal and monetary policies designed to counter appreciation (IMF 2005, p. 13).
‘Concerns about inflation,’ the study cautions, ‘must be balanced against the dangers of
failing to absorb the aid and of crowding out the private sector’ (IMF 2005, p. 5).17

Of course, there may be other good reasons for aid-intensity ceilings, apart from
macroeconomic concerns. ‘Plentiful aid,’ Bevan (2005, p. 4) observes, ‘may induce
corruption and other rent-seeking activities in much the same way that resource rents
have frequently done.’ Plentiful aid can lure governments into unsustainable expenditure
commitments, a problem discussed below. Plentiful aid can undermine sovereignty:
‘Countries whose budgets rely heavily on aid flows rather than on their own domestic
resources,’ Heller (2005, p. 22) observes, ‘give up significant political autonomy in their
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capacity to manage and make decisions on budget priorities.’ Plentiful aid also can
undermine democracy, diminishing political accountability to the local populace and
tilting the state’s attention instead to accountability to donors. And capping the ratio of
external resources to total expenditures strengthens incentives for domestic resource
mobilization.

Taking into account these costs of aid, as well as its benefits, policy makers again may
face an ‘inverted-U’ curve, with aid intensity on the horizontal axis and aid’s contribution
to the goals of statebuilding and peacebuilding on the vertical axis: aid may advance
these goals up to a point, after which its marginal impact turns negative. If so, again there
is a need to analyze where this turning point is located in specific times and places, and
what can be done to shift the curve by enhancing the positive effects of aid and
countering its negative effects.

Donor agencies, operating within an overall budget envelope, also face an opportunity
cost: aid provided to one country cannot be provided to another. In recent years, donors
increasingly have adopted country assessment tools in an effort to channel aid to those
countries where it will have the greatest positive impact. The World Bank, for example,
uses Country Policy and Institutional Assessment scores in allocating aid (World Bank
2005c). The European Union uses results-based performance indicators, such as
vaccination and school enrollment rates, to guide its budget support to developing
countries (European Commission 2005). This move towards selectivity has led to a
bifurcation between ‘aid darlings’ and ‘aid orphans’ – governments that score well in
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such assessments and those that score poorly (World Bank and IMF 2005, p. 17)
Wartorn countries are often in the latter camp.

Two innovations could make selective aid allocations better attuned to the requirements
of postwar statebuilding. The first is the incorporation of trends, as well as levels, into
existing performance indicators.18 The second is the development of new indicators that
assess progress in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The latter would apply conflict
assessment to the allocation of aid among countries as well as within them.

5. Who Benefits? Expenditure through a conflict lens

Turning to the expenditure side of public finance, policy making in postwar settings
requires careful attention to questions of to whom and well as what.

The ‘what’ question is about priorities. Faced with many pressing needs – for spending in
areas such as public safety, the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, health,
education, and the rehabilitation of economic infrastructure – how should scarce
resources best be allocated? The key point here is that the aim must be not simply to
maximize returns defined in terms of conventional development indicators, but also to get
the most ‘non-bang for the buck’ in terms of building a durable peace.

Making the same point, the synthesis report emerging from the World Bank’s research
program on violent conflict observes that this ‘creates the potential for trade-offs between
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policies that promote growth and those that promote peace’ (Collier et al. 2003, p. 166).
In particular, a strategy focused exclusively on short-term economic returns might
concentrate spending on the capital city and developed regions of the country, leading to
‘a trade-off between the growth-maximizing geographic distribution of public
expenditure and a distribution that might be regarded as fair.’ Where such trade-offs
exist, the report concludes, ‘the government may need to give priority to policies for
peace building.’

When viewed through a conflict lens, the ‘what’ question in public expenditure cannot be
divorced from the ‘to whom’ question. Two sets of issues are particularly relevant. The
first is how to incorporate vertical and horizontal equity concerns into spending
decisions. The second is how to allocate expenditures across the political landscape so as
to bolster incentives for the implementation of accords and the consolidation of peace.

Conflict impact assessments could address both sets of issues. These are analogous to
environmental impact assessments, first introduced in the 1970s, with the difference that
here the concern is the social and political environment rather than the natural
environment. Just as environmental impact assessment aims to incorporate ‘negative
externalities’ of pollution and natural resource depletion into expenditure policies, so
conflict impact assessment aims to incorporate the ‘negative externalities’ of social
tensions and violent conflict.
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Today, efforts to incorporate equity impacts into expenditure decisions are still in their
infancy. Information on vertical equity – the distribution of benefits across the poor-torich spectrum – is sometimes collected and sometimes used as an input into policy
making. In many cases, however, even such basic data are not available.

In the case of horizontal equity – distribution across regions and groups defined on the
basis of race, ethnicity, language, or religion – the current lack of information is even
more glaring. Collection of regional data on expenditures in administrative units, such as
states, provinces, and districts, would seem to be relatively straightforward, both
practically (since ministries often allocate their funds across regional units) and
politically (since regions often can serve as a proxy for more sensitive categories such as
ethnicity). Yet today such data are remarkably few and far between. Afghanistan’s former
finance minister and his colleagues recount their experience:

Obtaining the figures on provincial expenditures from line ministries required
months of intense discussion and analysis of manual systems of recordings. When
the figures were first presented to the Cabinet, it came as a shock that the ten
poorest provinces of the country were receiving the smallest amounts of
allocation. (Ghani et al. 2007, p. 179).

The most unusual feature of this experience is that the finance ministry went to the
trouble to request this information. Faced with such paucity of data, conflict impact
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assessment today is roughly where environmental impact assessment was three decades
ago. But the search for new analytical tools has begun.19

In addition to equity, postwar expenditure policy must consider balances of power among
and within competing parties. This requires attention not only to community-wide
characteristics such as living standards and ethnicity, but also to the stances of individual
political leaders who often vary in their commitment to peace. Some leaders are
enthusiastic about implementing peace agreements, others are lukewarm, and still others
are prepared to resume war rather than make concessions for peace. Selective allocation
of public spending can be one instrument to reward those who are committed to peace,
penalize spoilers, and encourage vacillators to get off the fence on the side of peace
implementation.20 If, however, public spending instead strengthens the hand of
hardliners, this can contribute to an unraveling of the peace process.

Systematic attention to this dimension of the ‘to whom’ question is rare. One exception is
the selective allocation of aid to municipalities in Bosnia and Hercegovina, taking into
account the stance of local authorities regarding implementation of the Dayton Peace
Agreement’s key provisions. The ‘open cities’ program of the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees, for example, targeted reconstruction assistance to
municipalities whose officials agreed to welcome the return of refugees and internally
displaced persons. Similarly, the World Bank sought advice from the Office of the High
Representative in allocating aid for rehabilitation of municipal infrastructure.21 To date,
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however, such conflict sensitivity in expenditure decisions remains the exception rather
than the rule.

6. Dual Public Sector or Dual Control? External support for domestic expenditure

The international community often seeks to help postwar governments to develop fiscal
capacity to allocate and manage expenditure by providing technical assistance. More
could be done, however, if donors were to channel a greater share of their resources
through the state rather than bypassing it. This will require new strategies for combating
corruption and ensuring fiduciary responsibility.

Beyond the ‘dual public sector’

The current practice of routing the lion’s share of external assistance outside the
government gives rise to a ‘dual public sector’: an internal public sector that is funded
and managed by the government, and an external public sector that is funded and
managed by the donors. In sheer money terms, the latter frequently dwarfs the former.

The dual public sector phenomenon has several adverse consequences. Most evident is
the opportunity cost of failing to tap these resources to build state capacities to allocate
and manage public expenditure. Less obvious, but no less serious, is the ‘crowding-out’
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effect as professionals are recruited into the external public sector, often at salaries that
the government cannot match.

The fact that the external public sector is managed by numerous agencies, each with their
own priorities, also poses enormous coordination problems. This also leads to the waste
of scarce administrative resources, as government ministries cope with the different
reporting systems of multiple funders. Last but not least, there are no institutional
mechanisms that make donor agencies accountable to the local citizenry. No matter how
imperfect the degree of democratic governance, the state arguably has a comparative
advantage in this respect.

When pressed on this issue, donors maintain that they (and the non-governmental
organizations and private contractors on whom they often rely) do a more effective job
than the government in delivering goods and services. This is not an argument that can be
dismissed lightly. There undoubtedly are situations in which the short-run advantages of
circumventing the state are compelling. But once we recognize that the long-run aim of
aid is – or ought to be – to build state capacities as well as to deliver services, the
argument loses at least some of its force.

Experience shows that the ‘short run’ can last a long time. In Cambodia, where more than
a decade has elapsed since the United Nations transitional administration handed power
to a new government, spending on technical assistance remains two to three times greater
than the total wages paid to government civil servants (Smoke and Taliercio 2007, p. 81).
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The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) offers an instructive model for how
donors can route aid through the government – in effect, helping to internalize external
resources. The ARTF is a World Bank-administered account through which donors help
to fund the government’s recurrent budget. The government allocates these external
resources through its internal budgetary process, reinforcing the budget as the central
instrument of policy. When the ministries spend the money – for example, paying
teachers – an external monitoring agent appointed by the World Bank verifies that the
accounting standards of the ARTF and government (which are the same) have been met,
and releases the funds. The ARTF thus is like a bank account with a fiduciary screen.
Approximately two-thirds of the Afghan government’s non-security recurrent budget is
now being funded by the ARTF, although this amount remains small relative to total
external assistance.22

Channeling aid through the government in this fashion does not imply that the donors
abdicate control or responsibility for how their resources are used. The ARTF does not
issue blank checks. Two signatures are required to release funds, one from the
government and one from the external monitoring agent. The result is a dual-control
system – a setup analogous to the dual-key system used to prevent an accidental launch
of nuclear missiles.
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Combating corruption

Corruption saps the delivery of public services, deters private investment, and fuels
popular discontent.23 But efforts to combat it are complicated where corruption helps to
maintain political cohesion by distributing resources through informal channels. Not all
corruption is equally corrupt, or equally corrosive: in some cases it is driven entirely by
individual greed, but in others it provides patronage resources for wider networks. An
example of the latter is the use of government revenues and profits from state-sanctioned
monopolies to lubricate ‘neopatrimonial’ governance in the Palestinian Authority under
Yasir Arafat (see Brynen 2007).

Donors often adopt an ‘avoidance strategy’ for dealing with corruption: avoid ‘leakages’
by bypassing the government, and avoid public discussion of the topic for fear of ruffling
political feathers. This strategy is dysfunctional for two reasons. First, aid that is routed
outside the government is not insulated from either the perception or the reality of
corruption.24 Indeed, the lack of transparency and accountability mechanisms can fuel
public perceptions that externally administered projects are even more prone to
corruption than government projects.25

Second, the avoidance strategy fails to harness aid to build the state’s capacity to budget
and manage public expenditure effectively. And just as the refusal of the donor agencies
to pay taxes has a demonstration effect – sending a message to the populace of no
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confidence in the government – so, too, their refusal to route resources through the
government sends an unmistakable signal.

An alternative strategy for addressing problems of corruption would have two prongs.
The first is the use of dual-control systems, like the ARTF, to build more robust
institutions for accountability and transparency along with public expenditure
capacities.26 The second is to devise transitional adjustment assistance programs for
people who have been dependent on patronage networks, recognizing that corruption for
this purpose differs from personal corruption. Such assistance would be analogous, in a
sense, to job training programs for workers displaced by the effects of trade liberalization
in industrialized countries, and – closer to home – to the disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration (DDR) programs for ex-combatants that are often implemented in
postwar countries.

7. Thinking about Tomorrow, Today? Getting serious about fiscal sustainability

External resources that are spent today – whether channeled through the state or around it
– often have consequences for how domestic resources must be spent tomorrow. This is
true both for recurrent expenditures, like salaries, and for capital expenditures that will
require spending for operation and maintenance in future years. Hence there is a need to
think about the long-term fiscal implications of current decisions.
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In the aftermath of war, attention to pressing short-term needs is perfectly natural, and
perfectly valid. But this does not imply that the future consequences of today’s decisions
can or should be shunted aside for others to handle later. The long run begins in the short
run. Myopia not only postpones getting serious about long-run problems, but also can
make them worse.

Although much can be done to enhance domestic revenue capacities, the sky is not the
limit. Prudence demands recognition that budget constraints will always be a fact of life.
In building new government institutions and infrastructure, this reality must be borne in
mind. It would be a mistake to rely on a transitory flush of external funds to create
structures that are not fiscally sustainable. The point may seem obvious, but past
experience suggests that it is often ignored.

Consider, for example, security spending in Afghanistan, where the Afghan National
Army has been built with large-scale funding from the United States government.
Security-sector expenditures in the three-year period from 2003/04 to 2005/06 were
equivalent to 494% of the Afghan government’s revenue, or roughly one-third of the
country’s GDP.27 ‘Total security expenditures will exceed forecast domestic revenues for
some years to come,’ warns a recent World Bank study (2005a, p. 47) that describes the
situation as ‘unaffordable and fiscally unsustainable.’

As Ghani et al. (2007, p. 182) remark, ‘Even under very optimistic projections for
domestic revenue, such an expenditure on security would imply a totally inadequate
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allocation of resources for human capital, infrastructure, and other vital functions of
government.’ Even from a security standpoint, unsustainable expenditures are
shortsighted. A well-equipped army that isn’t getting paid ceases to be a security force.
Instead it becomes an insecurity force.

A recent operational note prepared jointly by the United Nations Development Group and
the World Bank (2005, p 4) draws the clear lesson from such experiences: ‘It is important
to ensure that security issues are treated as an integral part of the national planning and
budgetary process, rather than through separate fora which may lead to a lack of
transparency or the taking of decisions which are fiscally unsustainable or undermine
other reconstruction efforts.’

The problem of unsustainable expenditure is not confined to the security sector. Salary
supplements for civil servants – including ‘sitting fees’ for attending donor-funded
workshops, where ‘the daily rates can exceed regular monthly salaries’ (Moss et al. 2005,
p. 7) – likewise can create problems for fiscal sustainability. Citing studies showing that
additional remuneration to civil servants in Cambodia far exceeds their regular salaries, a
recent UNDP study concludes that ‘the principal incentive to work in public employment
is the prospect of access to external salary supplements’ (Beresford et al. 2004, p. 33).

Capital investments with high operation and maintenance costs also generate fiscal
burdens down the road. In Palestine, Brynen (2007, p. 199) reports, aid donors have often
ignored the development plans of the Palestinian Authority (PA), ‘undercutting any PA
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effort to monitor the cumulative long-term costs of donor-financed investments.’ Again
he points to the resulting distortion in incentives: the ‘lure of donor money’ encouraged
government officials to put forward projects ‘not because they were a real priority, but
because they seemed most likely to attract some external funding.’

A famous example of a costly, donor-driven project with high ‘flagpole value’ but
problematic fiscal implications is the Gaza hospital financed by the European Union
(Brynen 2000, pp. 196-197). ‘Donor-driven investments in public hospitals are
sometimes referred to as “Trojan horses”,’ notes a recent World Bank report (2005b, p
52), ‘because of their large operating costs which crowd resources out of priority areas
such as the basic package of health services.’

Closely related to this problem is the bias of many aid-funded projects in favor of an
excessive reliance on imports. In deciding the extent to which the goods and services
purchased for relief, recovery, and reconstruction should be imported, as opposed to
being procured locally, donors face another tension between short-run expediency and
long-run capacity building (the capacity in this case being in the private sector). Again
there are undoubtedly cases where the former trumps the latter: for example, where local
sourcing would require large investments with long gestation periods. But there are also
cases where local procurement could do more to stimulate economic recovery, and
perhaps save money in the process. 28
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To cite an example of the pervasive bias against local suppliers, during the United
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, some quarter of a million desks and
chairs for local schools were purchased with money from the World Bank-administered
Trust Fund for East Timor. At the time, some Timorese officials suggested that some of
these be procured locally to spur the growth of small and medium woodworking
enterprises. The international officials rejected this on the grounds that local procurement
would be too slow (Pires and Francino 2007, pp. 141-2). This was not a life-or-death case
of emergency food supplies where time was of the essence; the goods in question were
school furniture.29

The interwoven challenges of building an effective state, a robust economy, and a durable
peace all require thinking about tomorrow, today. Postwar inflows of external assistance
cannot be sustained indefinitely. The success of this aid ultimately will rest on whether
the structures built with it can be sustained without it.

8. Odious Debts? Facing war’s financial legacy

Large external debts are often among the baneful legacies inherited by a postwar
government. These debts impede the war-to-peace transition in two ways. First, debtservice payments absorb scarce resources that otherwise could be allocated to
peacebuilding expenditures. Second, the overhang of accumulated debt deters investment
and new lending to the country.
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The original loans often were of dubious benefit to the country’s people. Indeed, insofar
as they financed predatory and oppressive regimes, some of the loans not only failed to
benefit the majority of the populace, but may have actively harmed them.

To cite a stark example, after the fall of the Taliban regime the Russian government
claimed that the new Afghan government owed it $10 billion, most of it for aid provided
in the 1980s when the Soviet army was fighting in Afghanistan. The Karzai
administration refused to accept this obligation, arguing that ‘the Soviet Union spent the
money for its own political and strategic purposes, not to benefit the Afghan people.’30
This argument echoes the stance taken a century earlier by the U.S. commissioners at the
Paris peace conference after the Spanish-American war. At issue were the external debts
incurred by Cuba under Spanish colonial rule, and whether these would be passed to the
new Cuban government. The U.S. repudiated these debts on the grounds that the purpose
of the loans had been not to benefit the Cuban people but rather to finance ‘the
continuous effort to put down a people struggling for freedom from the Spanish rule.’31
In international law, this became known as the ‘doctrine of odious debt.’32

The Russian claims in Afghanistan might be seen as lying at one end of a legitimacyillegitimacy spectrum, but the legitimacy of many other post-bellum debts can be
questioned, too. The Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, inherited a $12 billion
external debt from the Mobutu regime (Ndikumana and Boyce 1998). Much of this
arguably could qualify as ‘odious’ debt, in that the Congolese people did not benefit and
that the creditors knew or should have known that this would be the case. Similar
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questions can be raised about the wartime debts incurred by the Angolan government,
some of them backed by liens on that country’s future oil revenues (Boyce 2005).

Yet the principle that external debts are sacrosanct, unless ‘forgiven’ by the creditors,
remains official doctrine today. In the case the IMF and World Bank, for whom debt
write-offs have been taboo until recently, this poses a stumbling block: lending to
postwar governments cannot begin until past debt arrears have been cleared. This is
usually accomplished by means of bridge loans from bilateral donors, which are used to
clear the arrears, opening the door to new loans from the Bank and Fund that in turn are
used to repay the bridge loans.33 By this stratagem, debts contracted by the ancien régime
are recycled as fresh debts of the postwar government.

Today there is renewed interest in the doctrine of odious debt. One recent proposal has
been to empower an international body – such as the UN Security Council or an
independent commission of jurists – to declare governments to be illegitimate, in which
case subsequent loans to such governments would be designated as odious (Kremer and
Jayachandran 2003). This might curb lending to noxious regimes in the future, but it
would not address the legacy of odious debts created by lending in the past.

The case of Iraq has placed the latter issue into the spotlight. Soon after the U.S.-led
invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime, U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow
declared: ‘Certainly the people of Iraq shouldn't be saddled with those debts incurred
through the regime of the dictator who’s now gone.’34 In a similar vein, two former U.S.
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Treasury officials proposed the establishment of an international debt commission for
Iraq that would examine all outstanding claims and disallow debt that was used for state
security or military aggression (Mulford and Monderer 2003).35

Such ad hoc measures, devised on a country-by-country basis, may be better than
nothing. A systematic approach to the problem of odious debt, however, could be
implemented by establishing an international institution empowered to adjudicate
questions of debt legitimacy in postwar countries. The Norwegian government’s call for
the creation of ‘an international debt settlement court’ to hear matters concerning
illegitimate debt is a step in this direction.36 In addition to easing debt-service burdens, an
institution with a mandate to review debt claims in postwar countries could function as a
financial ‘truth commission,’ analogous to truth commissions that aid the reconciliation
process by documenting responsibility for crimes of violence. The Peacebuilding
Commission of the United Nations, established at the request of the September 2005
World Summit, might be an appropriate forum to launch such an initiative.37

Apart from its benefits to the public purse in postwar countries, such an institution could
have a salutary effect on the functioning of international credit markets in the future.38
The risk that debts could be declared odious would curb the ‘moral hazard’ problem that
arises when creditors believe that they are insured against the risk of debt repudiation,
diluting their incentives to guard against it. The existence of an international debt
adjudication body would encourage creditors to exercise due diligence in lending
decisions, helping to ensure that future loans are used for bona fide public purposes.
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Conclusion: Getting priorities right

These public-finance issues have far-reaching implications for policy making by
governments and international agencies engaged in the interwoven tasks of postwar
peacebuilding, statebuilding, and economic development. There is a pressing need for
reforms to align policies more effectively to the dynamics of war-to-peace transitions.
These include paying more serious attention to distributional impacts on both the revenue
and expenditure sides of fiscal policy; weighing potential tradeoffs between
macroeconomic stability and political stability in setting budget-deficit and aid-intensity
targets; and devising innovative strategies to address postwar legacies of external debts.

In the arenas of peace implementation and economic development, there is a need for
policy reforms aligned to the public-finance requirements of statebuilding. These include
devising ways to tap postwar aid inflows so as to prime the pump of domestic revenue
collection; moving from the ‘dual public sector’ towards dual control of aid-financed
expenditures; and rethinking spending and procurement practices in light the long-term
goals of fiscal sustainability and economic recovery.

These reforms would foster greater policy coherence among the many actors engaged in
postwar peacebuilding, statebuilding and development activities. Coherence requires
coordination among multiple agencies and institutions with the aim of fostering
complementarities rather than duplicating efforts or working at cross-purposes. This is no
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small task. While calls for better coordination have become so frequent as to be almost a
platitude, efforts to achieve it run up against the familiar obstacles of bureaucratic
rivalries and contests for resources.

Coherence also requires agreement on the ends of policy, as well as coordination of the
means. Economic policymakers have devoted a great deal of attention to the problem of
‘getting prices right.’ But ‘getting priorities right’ is a more profound problem, and it has
not received commensurate attention. In wartorn societies, building a durable peace
should be a top priority for public policy – indeed, arguably it is the top priority. Both
statebuilding and economic development are central to this goal. Peacebuilding
operations could support these processes more effectively. At the same time,
statebuilding and development strategies could be reframed with the objective of
peacebuilding more firmly in mind. In wartorn societies, the soundness of public finance
ultimately must be assessed in terms of its effects on the dynamics of violent conflict.
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Hanlon (2006).

33

For example, in December 1995 the IMF lent $45 million to Bosnia – the first loan issued under the
Fund’s newly created emergency credit window for post-conflict countries. The IMF heralded this loan as
‘a new beginning,’ but its purpose was simply to allow the Bosnian government to repay a bridge loan from

44

the Dutch government, which in turn was used to repay Bosnia’s assessed share of the former Yugoslavia’s
arrears to the IMF. Old Yugoslavian debt was thereby transformed into new Bosnian debt. Similarly, in
2002 the IMF lent $543 million to the DRC, $522 million of which was used to repay bridge loans from the
governments of Belgium, France, Sweden, and South Africa that had been used to clear IMF debt
contracted under Mobutu (IMF, ‘IMF Approves US$750 million PRGF Arrangement for the Democratic
Republic of the Congo,’ Press Release No. 02/27, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2002/pr0227.htm). For further discussion of arrears clearance
operations, see Alvarez-Plata and Bruck (2007).
34

Quoted in Beattie (2003).

35

The Paris Club of official creditors agreed to write of 80% of $39 billion in Saddam-era debts, not on the
basis of a determination of which debts were legitimate but rather on the basis of debt sustainability
calculations by the IMF. As of this writing, negotiations are continuing on other components of Iraq’s $120
billion in external debts (Chung 2005).

36

See the Soria Moria Declaration on International Policy, October 2005, available at
http://www.dna.no/index.gan?id=47619&subid=0.
37

‘2005 World Summit Outcome,’ 15 September 2005, paras. 97-105. Available at
http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html.
38

For discussion, see Buckley (2002) and Boyce and Ndikumana (2005).
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